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INTRODUCTION 
A LOOK AT HEALTH CARE FROM A THIRD PARTY 
PAYOR PERSPECTIVE 
I am a little concerned about the organization of my speech because 
everyone that has spoken before me has gotten me excited about one 
aspect or another of the business. I am going to try to limit my 
remarks in the interest of time. Some questions came up a little 
earlier about a subject I did not intend to cover in a lot of 
detail. I would like you to think of this talk as a smorgasbord to 
stimulate questions. I don't think I will lack for being 
controversial, but I would like to be responsive to your questions 
and concerns rather than think that I am closing anything out with 
my comments. 
Let me make some introductory remarks before I get into the slides. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is a mutual insurance company; 
it operates private insurance, contracts with the Federal 
government, and also operates HMOs. It has two operational HMOs and 
its business plan for the next four years call for an additional 
eight HMOs, three of which are to be operational in 1984. 
Just another couple of comments. To me this is a very special 
community because on the one hand it has the state's leader 
industrially as well as from the standpoint of risk taking and 
innovation. 
on the other hand, 
it has 





needs as has 
been shown by the earlier 
demonstration --
an obviously innovative, 
risk-taking approach to 
the management of that health care center. 
The ingredients for 
successfully managing change 
seem to be here and that's why 
I'm so 
pleased to be participating. 
I've just come off a stint of 
15 
months as 
a member of the 
Governor's Task Force where 
I sometimes was treated by those who 
favor regulation as being to the right of "Atilla the Hun". 
W
e had 
our last meeting yesterday. 
The verbiage would suggest 
success for 
the competitive model, 
but 
the reality suggests success 
for 
regulation. 
I will be happy to 
get into the details of
 the 
recommendations 
during the question 
and answer period, 
but the 
philosphy and the endorsement and the generalities are 
toward the 
marketplace while the real bottom line is toward regulation. 
The one chart 






I thought that one wasn't needed 
because all of you are dealing with cost centers or profit and loss 
statements or some other aspects of the pricing problem. 
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Florida a move to db 
sumething about it which.is evidence to us of 
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anticipatory price increases that are further hurting the 
inflationary problem as people try to improve their margins in 
anticipation of State rate regulation. We think there is a need to 
take action in the near term. 
One of the thoughts that I want to touch on before getting into the 
formal remarks is the notion that insurers are sort of not really 
interested; they're passive; they funnel money; they act as 
conduits. I will give you a very brief summary of what I've seen 
over a period of years. 
This business came out of the depression; it was largely started by 
trustees of hospitals who were worried about bankruptcies and it 
received tremendous consumer acceptance; the insurance industry 
joined them and there was explosive growth. over the years the 
Federal government expanded the hospital system through its various 
funding techniques. By the middle sixties, prior to Medicare and 
with the exception of the Medicare population, there was 
overwhelmingly available coverage; ninety or so percent of the 
public was covered. 
Since the middle sixties, there has been a steady expansion in the 
scope of benefits into a variety of areas such as dental. Early 
efforts to restrict cost contained a silent assumption that 
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hospitals were well-intentioned, efficient; and basically under the 
control of the industrial leadership of their communities. 
Therefore, early cost-containment efforts were focused upon 
questions like: can I audit your books? (Blue cross Plan) or Do I 
have a measure of reasonable charges? (which is the peer group 
comparison for a traditional insurance plan). 
These went on and on. Look at some of the Northeastern and 
Midwestern Blue Cross Plans; their contracts with hospitals put 
limits on pension costs, on interest costs, on operating margins, on 
expansion programs -- generally making them subject to some other 
community voluntary agency for review and approval for purposes of 
expansion. 
Physicians started with fee schedules. some in many states agreed 
not to balance bill for any additional amount. Then the problem of 
equity among specialties came into play. Then the fee schedules 
broke down. Medicare in the steel industry said, "We have a better 
way. We'll pay you your going charge as long as we determine it to 
be reasonable." Then we entered into a spiral far in excess of what 
was expected in the fee area. 
Since that time there have been more recent efforts at 
negotiations. As some have been successful in some states, there 
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have been negotiations with state government formally or informally 
involved. Since about 1972, and 1975 in particular, when the 
wage/price controls were lifted, industry was confronted with the 
rising cost problem. The real focus of attention shifted from 
adequate coverage (i. e. , access to coverage, are people covered?) to 
what can we do about the cost? Of course, I'm not mentioning the 
tremendous demand that came about because of Medicare during the 
same period. 
In the early seventies, experiments in prospective reimbursement of 
hospitals such as what Medicare has just adopted were put into 
place. Other efforts included expansion of out-of-hospital 
benefits. (Incidentally, as an insurer this has always come back to 
bite me with larger cost. It's one of those false hopes of which 
there are many. ) second opinions, pre-admission testings, pre­
admission certification, length-of-stay certification, tight medical 
necessity provisions, highly sophisticated computer systems, and 
various other techniques have all been used and generally at the 
margin do some good. 
one of the very profound studies that has been done on expanded 
services has to do with nervous and mental conditions and the 
treatment of those on an out-of-hospital basis. Massachusetts 
passed a law saying that if you paid a psychiatrist, you have to pay 
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a psychologist. so we have a little study that says if you want to 
raise psychologist's income to those of psychaitrist's, just pass 
that kind of a law. The only thing that has happened is that the 
charges for the psychologist have risen and there has been no 
reduction in payments to psychiatrists. 
Those kinds of perverse effects all seem to flow out of the basic 
notion that these plans were designed to get people to use care; 
they were designed to stimulate the development of an industry and 
have done that very well. But they're obviously obsolete. 
The other false hope that I want to sort of step on in order to 
stimulate some discussion later on is that coinsurance and 
deductibles will make things better. over 95% of what we sell in 
the State of Florida has coinsurance and deductibles. Generally 
speaking, once you get the one-year savings for reducing the scope 
of benefits, the rate of increase takes right off again. Another 
notion suggests that if employees aren't involved, they're not 
careful. We have a large group of State of Florida employees 
(84, 000 peop�e covered). On average, the Plan pays 50% of billed 
charges. That's made of two parts: the employer pays a large part 
of the cost of the program and the employee generally pays 20% and 
anything over the first $100 goes under the coinsurance provision 
(he pays the first $100). Also there are numerous fixed dollar 
6 
l 
limits within the plan to limit the liability. Even with those 
limits and the employee paying perhaps half of the total cost of the 
premium, the rates of increase of that plan generally match that of 
the rest of the population. This is but one of many examples. 
Another one you may not be familiar with is health services for the 
elderly. Medicare pays about 50% of the billed out-of-hospital 
services for patients over 65. Fifty percent is not paid as either 
being higher than allowable charges, disallowed because of 
administrative or medical necessity reasons, or subject to the 
coinsurance and deductible provision that applies in that program. 
Notwithstanding that, the most rapid rate of increase and usage is 
in the out-of-hospital service area. so the appeal of the 
involvement of the patient seems to be an intuitive one, not 
necessarily borne out in the real world in which we operate. 
There is an interesting experiment going on by Ford which gets at 
another weakness of coinsurance and deductible programs. It works 
like this. If the patient doesn't pay the doctor the deductible and 
coinsurance, then it shows up as a bad debt. The bad debt shows up 
as an increase in the cost of doing business and that becomes a 
legitimate basis for raising his price. The same thing is also true 
for the hospital. Unless you make the assumption that those bad 




"legitimate basis for raising the price of service." We see 
evidence in some parts of the community where the coinsurance 
provisions are simply not billed; there's really a dual-price 
structure and the prices are set based upon what the income and 
overall experience is. 
A couple of other notions are relevant to the introductory 
comments. In addition to efforts at cost containment, there has 
been tremendous growth in the area of self-funding administration. 
You might be interested to know that self-funding is encouraged by a 
lot of insurers whose experience tells them that if they can give up 
one to two percent of income and get off the risk in the health 
insurance business that's a good business deal for them -- which 
says something about whether it's a good business deal for the 
business and industry group. The record interest rate on reserves 
that was earned in the late seventies and early eighties was a 
definite stimulus, but self-insurance/self-administration is the 
single most rapidly growing phenomena in the health insurance field. 
Finally, of course, there has been a tremendous increase in the 
emphasis on data for analysis, which I consider to be one of the 
healthiest things that's going on. There is one large national 
employer (AT&T) who requires an enormous amount of data for every 
single claim transaction. Not for the purpose of adjudicating the 
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claim, but rather for the purpose of analyzing and determining what 
variations are occurring in the various operating areas. We think 
that this is a problem amenable to business analysis and that much 
more of a direct analysis activity has real potential. During this 
period also the insurers have learned that there may be business out 
there they can get but they may not want it. They have tried to 
tighten their underwriting. The industry newsletter recently 
carried a lead article saying there's all the small group health 
insurance you can sell in the market, but the trick is to do it and 
break even and make a little bit of money on it. 
This is by way of background. What I'm trying to say is that the 
industry thus far has not really been passive, but obviously has not 
been successful. As I would like to get into a little more detail 
on what we see ahead, keep in mind one quote which I'm paying dearly 
for having made in a public forum because my salesmen heard it, and 
that is: "traditional health insurance is not sick, it's dead; it 
just has not been buried. " I had to explain that to my salesmen and 
I'm having some fun. 
Slide 1 
Alternative Approaches to cost containment: 
Third Party Payor Perspective 
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I would like to briefly get into some public policy questions and 
some statistics. I'll try not to belabor you with statistics you've 
probably already seen. I'll focus a little on the insurance 
industry and then on some alternatives. 
Slide 2 
Approaches for Containing Health care costs: 
Market Reform vs. Direct Economic Regulation. 
First of all we think that the key is competition vs. economic 
regulation. But we think it's not competition as the world has 
been, it's market reform -- without which competition works poorly. 
Slide 3 
What is Health care 
1. A Monopoly? 
2. A competitive Industry? 
3. A Developing Competitive Industry? 
What is health care? If it's a monopoly it ought to be regulated. 
If it's a competitive industry there's a chance for marketplace 
discipline to occur. Perhaps its a developing competitive industry 
that needs to move either into category one or two above. 
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Slide 4 
If _you look at standard economic analysis of those industries where 
regulation could be favored versus those where incentives could be 
favored, you can see under regulation a lot of the simplifications 
that staff to legislative committees like to make. Unless you can 
make those assumptions you will fail in regulations -- such as good 
information on cost and quantities, definition of products, and 
clear objectives, and so on. The right-hand side of this slide 
describes more of what's really involved in this industry. With one 
fundamental inadequacy, the fourth line down: high responsiveness 
to price changes. 
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At the transaction of delivering care that is not the case; that is 
why market reform is essential. The multiplicity and the subtle 
nature of many of the objectives makes it very difficult for 
judgments to be made. If any of you read the Wall Street Journal 
article of a few months back on the British National Health system 
and decision making, it's very clear that money is allocated 
according to the political process (i. e. , according to which 
community has the most politicial influence). And if you have not 
dealt in the state government and know that the state agency staff 
depend upon friendly legislators for their appropriations and other 
things, then the idea that there's some logical, rational decision 
making that goes on in state government is really a threat to good 
decision making for us because we may assume something will happen 
that won't happen. 
Slide 5 
Position of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida: 
1. Desire a sound, not lavish, health care 
system in Florida. 
2. Need to facilitate innovation and 
experimentation in delivery and financing of 
care. 
3. Change must occur in current adversarial 
relationship as regulatory agencies come 
under increasing pressure to solve health 
care costs problem. 
we try to advocate a sound, but not lavish, health care system. We 
need to facilitate innovation and experimentation in the delivery 
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and financing of care. By facilitate I mean also the ability to 
take risk. Change must occur in the current adversarial 
relationship as regulatory agencies come under increasing pressure 
to solve health care cost problems. We need more cooperative, 
mutually supportive relations between the public and private sector, 
a genuine desire to reform the marketplace and the desire to deal 
with the "disease" rather than the symptoms. If I have a fear, it 
is that the hospital industry will decide that the changes necessary 
for competition are too wrenching and, therefore, find regulation 
preferable. 
Slide 6 
4. Seek more cooperative, mutually supportive 
relations between public and private sector. 
5. Assuming a genuine desire to reform market 
place, to deal with •disease, • rather than 
symptoms, regulatory agencies should promote 
informed buying by consumers and facilitate 
meeting consumer need by insurers, coalitions 
and others. 
6. Seek deregulation, but not before 
restructuring of market to establish sound 
market conditions. 
7. Market reform is consistent with fundamental 
beliefs of our society. 
8. Placing greatest possible reliance on 
decentralized decision making is especially 
pertinent in health care, due to political 
obstacles to efficient governmental planning 
and regulation. 
seek deregulation specifically regarding certificate of need, but 
not before restructuring the market to establish sound market 
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conditions. The planning agency in Jacksonville is confronted with 
announced statements that there will be four HMOs operating in 
Jacksonville. They suddenly have a problem. The problem is the 
formula they have been using to decide how many hospitals beds are 
needed is more hospital beds than we will need. The agency was only 
set up to keep hospitals from building beds, not to figure out what 
to do when we have a surplus of beds and we won't need any more for 
years to come. Market reform is consistent with the fundamental 
beliefs of our society; the notion of decentralized decision making 
is especially pertinent in health care. There really is no ability 
for a person working in an analytical role in Tallahassee to 
understand the differences between Melbourne and other communities 
and their needs for appropriate services. We need to reinforce 
recent actions at the national and state level to create a market 
conducive to market reform proposals. 
Slide 7 
9. Reinforce recent actions at national and 
state level to create a market conducive to 
market reform proposals: 
A. Federal government - D. R.G. 's - hospitals 
now have burden of controlling own costs. 
B. Private and public negotiations with 
individual hospitals over price. - PPO's, 
HMO's etc. 
10. Purchase of indigent care by state, based on 
price and efficiency. 
14 
The Federal government has moved this way with their DRGs. I might 
add, if you haven't heard about Miami and the Medicare experiment, 
DRGs are mild compared to what's going on in Miami. It's kind of 
like the old west. There is a competitive model experiment going on 
and they say the reason is they want to find out all the good and 
the bad of competition. There are a number of operators down there 
and HMOs who are promising the world and the public is flocking to 
them in tens of thousands. Now the question is: Will they give 
quality care? Will they give it with reasonable waiting periods? 
Will they deal financially in a responsible way? our quess is that 
some will and some won't. If because some don't the whole idea is 
thrown out instead of establishing conditions for success, we will 
have lost an important opportunity -- private and public 
negotiations with individual hospitals over price and use. Most of 
the systems today really are talking about price and use combined. 
Finally, purchase of indigent care by the state based on price and 
efficiency. Another way of saying it is "competitively bid. " so, 
if I were to try and summarize what we see as the necessary steps, 




I would like to briefly go into a few statistics to highlight some 
features that may not be immediately available to you. This study 
was contracted out by the Health Care Financing Administration to 
break out health care inflation into its component parts: what was 
due to population, what was due to general inflation, what was due 
to health specific inflation, and the greater volume and 
sophiscation of services. I would like to dramatize the last part 
of that. 
A few years ago there was a publication put out by the American 
Hospital Association that looked at the number of x-rays ordered per 
patient day in teaching hospitals. It actually was finer than that, 
teaching hospitals with 300 or more beds. The results showed that 
the number of x-rays per patient day was increasing at an annual 
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rate of 15% per year (i. e. , volume of services per patient day). so 
as the technology changes, there are usage factors in there and 
given the complexity of the product, it's really very, very hard to 
nail down. This is the most definitive study that we're aware of on 
the subject. 
Slide 9 
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORY - 1981 
($ billion) 





Other_ Personal Health (dentists, eyeglasses, 
home health) 
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This slide shows the expenditures by category. The hospital 
industry is getting the focus of attention for several reasons: 
it's the largest single number; it's the most heavily insured 
number; and politically it's the group that you can get your hands 
on. We in the insurance business don't see health care cost 
increases the way they are recorded to the public. The way they're 
recorded to 
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the public typically is in terms of the price increase. The 
Jacksonville General Hospital raised its chart structure by 12% this 
year. The true cost which shows up in the claims that are paid 
by the employer and the insurance plan 
price and use. 
Slide 10 
is the compound effect of 
This slide shows that an 11% and a 10% increase produce a 22% 
increase in payouts. That's the number that determines employee 
benefit costs, insurance plan costs, and premium increases. That's 
the number the consumer is confronted with -- which is why there is 
so much popular support for rate regulation among the general 
public. The compound effect of these numbers is turning out to be 
staggering. so the core is to get at both price and use, certainly 
not just one of them. 
18 
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Now, let's talk about how the rates have increased and have effected 
the health insurance industry. First of all, in Florida there are 
600 companies earning group premiums, four firms have market shares 
exceeding 5%, 19 have market shares exceeding 1%, top 10 firms 
accounts for 59%; the top 50 firms account for 85%. That is about 
as close as you can come to a textbook example to pure competition. 
There is not much any of us can do to dominate the market. This is 
a very different situation than in the Northern states. We have 
about 15% of the market and we would guess that Aetna -- because 
they do so much ASO work which is not reported as premiums -­
probably is around 12 or 13%. 
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Slide 12 
The industry as a whole, from its health insurance activities has 
successively lost (taking the commercial insurers as a group) 1. 4 to 
2. 3 billion dollars. The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans have lost 
approximately half a billion dollars over each of the last three 
years. There was some improvement in 1983, but not significant 
improvement. Basically, health insurance is a losing business. 
Interest income on the money involved in current business does not 




This slide shows the average rate of increase that our customers 
would have had to have pay if they continued to take the same 
benefits in the next year as they had in the last year. Every time 
you give someone a rate increase you may induce some bargaining and 
negotiation that results in a contract change. 
If you want to see something instructive, though, look at 1981. In 
1980 we converted all of our small accounts to deductible and 
coinsurance as a cost-saving technique. What happened was that our 
income tended to level off and then we had an explosive increase in 
cost. In 1981 we had a $15, 000, 000 loss from underwriting 
operations. 
2 1  
Slide 14  
O. K. The make-up of  this rate assuming it is a group of say 100 
employees or so. Claims would account for about 90%, the 
administrative cost would account for 7-1/2%, and the risk and 
contingency factor assuming it was fully insured would account for 
about 2-1/2%. That would be what we would assume to be the case as 
we set the rate. In fact, we have not been able to obtain the 
2-1/2% due to price competition in the industry. 
22 
Slide 15 
One of the problems we are faced with is the long time periods over 
which we make a financial guarantee. We begin in one time period 
(shown on the left hand side of the chart) to accumulate 
experience. At about the end of the twelve months, we have a set of 
data which then must be seasoned for three more months. so that at 
the end of 15 months we have data which we consider useful for 
analysis for setting the next year's rate. We then enter into about 
a 30 day period of analysis and rate making and then 60 days with 
the customer going back and forth. (He may wish to change the plan 
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or the way it operates in some way. ) Finally, at point T2 a rate 
goes into effect which is generally guaranteed for 12 more months 
and for which claims do not come in until 15 months. so that 30 
months later we look at decisions that were made based upon 
assumptions gained in our previous business and then adapted through 
that 30 month period. Now, depending upon when renewal periods are, 
that can change slightly. But there is a fair degree of hazard. ·If 
you look at the reserves of any insurer (except the largest) in 
terms of how many years in a row they could miss their estimate by 
5%, it generally is not a lot of years or there wouldn't be an 
insurer around. 
Slide 16 
HEAL TH PLAN FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS 






1 13% 34% 
Self-insured, outside administered 6% 20% 23% 22% 
Insured, incl. Blue Cross/Blue Shield 83% 64% 61% 61% 
Combination (insured/self-insured) 4% 5% 6% 5% 
Number of survey responses 443 390 445 546 
Source: Markus, 1981 
Now as I mentioned earlier, self-insurance has been stimulated by 
both inflation and interest rates as well as other concerns. This 
is national data from the Library of Congress. The percent of 




And there are numbers to indicate that its well over 50% in 
Florida. Of the 22 firms in the south FJorida Coalition, 21 are 
self-insured. 
Slid� l'l 
A recent south Florida coalition survey of employers indicated that 
a total of 36 and 15 were either self-insured or partially 
self-insured, but that was not all of the employers. It was a large 
sector, but not all of them. 
What can you conclude from this and my earlier sort of brief 




o The current products of the industry reflect primarily the 
goal of public policy which was access to care. 
o The goal has now shifted from •unlimited access• to 
•efficiency. • 
o Choices for insurers: 
A. Invest in redesigning products that ensure cost 
effective delivery of health care. 
B. Reduce benefits significantly in the traditional product 
(and try and stay below your trend lines). 
c. Drop out of health insurance. 
We see all of these being done. Equitable being the best example of 
number c, having dropped out of writing groups of 100 lives or less 
which is traditionally where you're fully insured. And Prudential 
being an example of putting a heavy emphasis on A with a tremendous 
emphasis they're putting on the Prucare program to get their HMOs 
operational. Of course, they took the worst loss of any single 
company in any single year two years ago. 
one point I'd like to make here about public policy. A couple of 
very important points about public policy. There is unbelievable 
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support by the working public for health insurance and broad 
benefits. I dealt with the auto industry for 15 years. And you 
could get a strike faster by talking about adding a two dollar 
deductible than you could by taking a lot of money off the table. 
That was the real world of how they viewed things and their value 
system. 
I think there are three reasons for that that are not always 
remembered. First of all, during the Korean war and to some degree 
before then there were wage controls, but there was no limit on 
benefit controls. It really taught people that benefit dollars were 
valuable dollars. secondly, you have a tax policy that says every 
dollar in benefits you get is equal to $1.20 in salary. That hasn't 
been lost on the public. Thirdly, the tremendous flow of dollars 
has brought about for many people -- not necessarily in Florida, but 
for many people -- a reassurance that the provider of care will take 
the insurance payment and that user will not have a residual 
obligation. However, it worked out that you will not have one. The 
combination of those three factors means that there's little or no 
popular support for cutting those benefits. I don't believe that 
Medicare will cut its basic benefit plan in the face of the current 
cost pressure, not unless there is a restructuring of the financing 
and delivery system itself. so this basic notion of obsolescence is 
really the crucial issue. 
2 7  
Slide �-'1 
The famous cost shift. A cost shift is considered to have occurred 
in the hospital industry, not when someone fails to pay cost, but 
when someone fails to pay the price that management has determined 
on average should be paid. That automatically assumes that the 
margin is reasonable and appropriate. There's a long history behind 
that concept, going back to when hospitals were essentially 
community service agencies. The AHA worked with a lot of other 
folks to develop what was called the principles of financial 
requirements. They tried to define the economics necessary to 
survive and maintain plant and equipment, maintain currency with 
technology, and serve the community. That number is more than just 
accounting costs. 
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some margin is definitely needed for the business as a whole. on 
the other hand, as a member of the Hospital Cost Containment Board, 
I know of profit and non-profit hospitals who publicly say that an 
operating margin of 15% or more is appropriate. Now how many 
businesses do we have in America that are guaranteed 15% on sales? 
The first sound assumption is that the charges have been set to 
produce the right total amount of revenue. 
The second observation relates to Medicare. Here's a little 
Medicare history. Prior to Medicare in 1965, the Blue cross Plans 
in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Michigan and a few other states, 
working with community industry leaders, had set limits on what they 
would pay hospitals for care. The purpose was to encourage 
efficiency in order to guarantee hospital survival. But they were 
very general limits. I used the examples earlier of pension, 
interest, and a few others. Medicare was faced with deciding how to 
pay hospitals. Their staff discovered what Blue cross was doing and 
they baked it into a formula. If a Blue cross Plan would not pay 
for a certain interest or other cost, it generally would pay 2% 
above what hospital costs were calculated to be. The intent was to 
allow hospitals to meet their working capital requirement and to 
fund needed expansion because the historical price level 
depreciation may not have been adequate in those days of 1, 2, or 3% 
inflation. 
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Medicare used that guideline to begin with; it also used a factor 
for the greater intensity of the over 65. As time went on and 
Medicare got into budgetary trouble, those guidelines were 
eliminated. Thus, what may have started off being a good idea is 
not practiced today. There is no attempt to recognize the economic 
cost to the hosptial for serving the aged. In some cases the 
Medicare payment may be covering it, in other cases they may not 
be. The result is interesting. If the number of people under 
Medicare in the right hand box is greater than the number of people 
that are in the Private Pay category, then given Medicare's payment 
and the hospital's need for the same amount of dollars, the private 
payors will pay more. We could get to the ultimate contradication 
where 95% of the patients were Medicare and they only pay, say $10 
less a day than they need to pay, but the hospital has to get that 
$10 per patient day from the remaining 5% of the patients. 
Therefore, the hospital may charge the private pay patients $100 a 
day more than is needed. 
The key question in all of this is: What is appropriate in the 
first place? Let me describe the situation that's developed in 
Jacksonville: Jacksonville is overbedded with more than four beds 
per thousand, and it's a young population group. If these HMOs are 
operational, the Jacksonville market may need only three beds per 
thousand. Should all those hospitals have plans for capital 
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accumulation for future plant and equipment expansion for a greater 
number of beds? or should they be looking at reducing the number of 
beds? The problem arises because there is no price discipline 
forcing hospitals to make judgments based upon the market place. It 
is an extremely complicated issue. 
Slide 20 
This slide shows some numbers that are currently available on the 
average gross revenues for hospitals in Florida for the three years 
1970, 1980, and 1981: 271, 313, 374. That's what hospitals would 
have generated if everybody paid charges. Medicare does not, many 
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others do not. The gross revenue that would have been required if 
everyone paid full charges is shown the next line down: 217, 247, 
and 293. The resultant mark-up over and above the average cost that 
covers the margin that the hospital claims is needed is in the order 
of $54, $66, and $81 a day. It is paid by private industry, Blue 
Cross, Aetna, etc. 
There is a problem, but it varies from community to community and 
from hospital to hospital. Because of the way the Medicare program 
is funded, there is little likelihood that the problem will be 
corrected by Medicare agreeing to pay more. 
Slide 21 
Effective and fair price mechanism felt by 
providers and consumers does not exist. 
a. Consumers (physicians and patients) haven't 
been directly movtivated by price or 
efficiency of providers due to impact of 
traditional third party payments 
b. Payers haven't been able to negotiate with 
providers because they haven't been the ones 
to choose providers and didn't influence 
their choice. 
We feel that effective and fair price mechanisms do not exist as 
they should to affect provider and consumer behavior. Consumers 
have not been directly motivated by price or efficiency of providers 
due to the impact of traditional third-party payments. Regardless 
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of the deductible and coinsurance, if I go to a high-charging 
physician or an inefficient hospital, I have the same personal 
obligation. In most communities in Florida, there is a 100% range 
from low to high within specialties for the same service in the 
charges of physicians. so regardless of what you tinker with in the 
way of deductibles and coinsurance, you don't get at problem A. 
Payers haven't been able to negotiate with providers because they 
haven't been the ones to choose the providers and didn't influence 
their choice. 
Slide 22 
c. Providers have had no incentive as to price 
or efficiency because consumers were not 
impacted. 
d. Providers are not in equal position to 
compete because of disproportionate 
distribution of societal costs. 
Providers have not had an incentive as to price or efficiency 
because consumers were not affected. can you imagine the provider 
who reduces his investment for amenities and has a competitor who 
expands his amenities when the insurance plan pays all but $100 for 
each program? Providers are not in an equal position to compete 
because of dispropriate distribution of societal costs. We have 
hosptials today in Florida who could reduce their costs to the 




How can you ask the hospital that is serving the community with a 
large number of indigents to compete on the basis of price without 
equalizing the load? These are some of the fundamental barriers to 
the competitive system working. 
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Approaches to Achieve Effective and Fair Price 
Competition 
1. Allow payers to negotiate on behalf of 
insureds. 
a. Insureds agree to use only panel 
providers (HMO). 
b. Insureds receive some economic benefit 
for using panel providers (PPO). 
c. As a result of a. and b. , providers have 
new incentive for cost efficiencies. 
The conclusion would suggest that approaches which achieve effective 
and fair price competition are needed. Allow payors to negotiate on 
behalf of the insureds. There are three ways that can be done. 
Insureds agree to use only a panel of providers which is a 
traditional HMO in one form or another, insureds receive some 
economic benefit for using panel providers (PPO). The program we're 
about to launch in Miami will say to the insured, if you go to one 
of the more efficient providers, we will pay 80% of your cost after 
$100 deductible. If you go to another provider in the community, we 
will pay 65% of your cost and $100 deductible. It's taken a while 
for the market to accept that kind of a contract. Basically, what 
34 
had to happen is the same thing that happened to the price of 
gasoline. Once the price got to a certain level, people were 
willing to drive the Toyota. But as long as it was below a certain 
level, we hung onto the larger car, the old way of doing things. 
There is something to be given up and that's choice. The PPO 
offers, whether it's a permanent or temporary phenomenon, the chance 
of wide choice and the consumer receives a direct benefit if it's a 
prudent choice. 
As a result of (a) and (b) above, providers have new incentives for 
cost efficiencies. we know of hospital administrations that are 
profiling their physician community, talking with and counselling 
the physicians who have a history of ordering a large number of 
services -- disproportionate from their peer group for the same 
service, for the same diagnosis. In a cold, crass way that 
physician used to be an opportunity; he's now a liability. It's 
become a problem for the institution and now they will manage it. 
If the hospital operated more efficiently under the previous 
Medicare system or the previous insurance plan, it just meant they 
got paid less. 
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2. Equalize ability of providers to compete by 
equalizing societal costs. 
a. In long term, increase government funding 
and efficiency of purchasing, 
b. In short term, equalize by efficiency of 
purchasing, sharing of burden and other 
means. 
We must equalize the ablity of providers to compete by equalizing 
societal costs. In the long term, increase government funding and 
efficiency of purchasing. The first part of that has to do with 
Medicaid. Florida is 48th or 49th out of the 50 states in funding 
its Medicaid Program. It has come out of a very limited tradition 
in that regard and it will not change this year to any significant 
degree. The legislators are telling us that Proposition 1 is such a 
threat that they are not going to tolerate any possible tax at this 
time. Working within the constraint of currently available funds, 
you then get to (b) which is to equalize the burden among hospitals 
by using a method of assessing hospitals a portion of what they have 
been providing for indigent care; then giving it back to the 
hospitals along with Federal matching monies for taking care of the 
indigents, but based upon negotiated prices. In effect, we will 
take money out of the system, bring federal dollars in, match the 
two together and then use it to buy care on a competitive bid basis 
or some form of competitive bid. Those are essentially what I would 
call the market reform characteristics. Others would include 





Assessing the Florida Environment 
o Population concentration in metropolitan 
areas. 
o Growth of coalitions. 
o Prevalence of cost sharing in Florida. 
o over supply of physicians. 
o oversupply of beds in some areas. 
0 Growth in HMOS and PPOs. 
How would it play in Florida? The population is concentrated in 
metropolitan areas. That's important for the prospect of competition, 
because an area that is only served by one group of physicians or one 
facility may take the approach of saying I don't want to play. Growth of 
coalitions - that's an informed buyer. For example, the south Florida 
coalition serves a wonderful role. They took their claims data, matched 
it against the Hospital Cost Containment Board's published data on the 
cost of certain kinds of treatment in hospitals in Florida, and they 
found no relationship. They were dealing in reality; it was their claims 
data. Because the Hospital Cost Containment Board is an agency of state 
government, it has to do everything by rule. The HCCB made a sound 
assumption that whichever hospital you went to you got the same number of 
services, the same length of stay, etc. They created a hypothetical that 
does not exist and then said to the public use that to compare -- which 
is really counter-productive, although its not deliberate. 
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Florida is a state that already has well established cost-sharing as 
the standard in the employee community. You have to set your 
benefits and wages to be competitive in the labor market in which 
you compete. For a leading organization such as the Harris 
Corporation that's a national labor market, but at least for a large 
number of employers, it's a local labor market. Therefore, the wide 
prevalence of cost-sharing in Florida sets a good stage for the kind 
of changes we think are needed. 
There is a rapidly increasing supply of physicians and an oversupply 
of beds. Therefore, people are worried about patients. we are 
talking about the old fashioned business of cutting price in order 
to maintain market share. Finally, there is already a strong 
indication of the growth of HMOs and PPOs. 
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Access to Hospitals 
o 87. 9% of Floridians live in metropolitan 
areas (SMSA's) 
o 80% of Florida hospitals are in metropolitan 
areas 
source: 1980 u. s. Census, FHA Fact Book 
Just touching on some of these points, 88% of Floridians live in 
metropolitan areas, 80% of the hospitals are located in metropolitan 
areas, about 80% of the population has access to two or more 
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■ Operatio nal 
• Developmental 
o Feas ib i l ity 
This slide illustrates HMOs that are operational, formally in 
development, or where feasibility studies are underway. Incidently, 
the big money players are getting into HMOs both through venture 
capital activity and through the large insurance companies. We 
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Here is the historical growth and forecasted growth in HMO 
enrollment. If you look at the numbers they don't look very big 
until you look at the annual rates of change: 79' over 78' - 107%, 
80' - 46% over, and so on. 83' - 42% growth over 82. We think this 
will be a significant force. Don't assume that HMOs will 
necessarily dominate the marketplace. What they do is make price 
competition legitimate. Therefore, they stimulate other people's 
innovation in changing the way they do things. Therein lies the 
benefit. I doubt that the 1990 form of organization for serving the 
community is known; I don't think it's going to be what we are 
selling today or planning to sell next year. 
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This slide shows nationwide preimum increases for individual 
coverage. Between 1980 and 1982 there was a 29% increase for HMOs 
and a 49% increase for insurance plans. 
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The national utilization average for all Blue cross/Blue Shield 
plans is 700. Florida was higher than that, partly because of the 
higher average age under 65 -- we have a lot of 50-55 year old 
people. HMOs nationally were at 458 (that is days per thousand per 
year), federally qualified HMOs were at 4 39. our HMO in Tallahassee 
-- which tends to have a younger enrollment population -- is running 
about 350 days per thousand. 
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Florida physician manpower is important for both HMO and PPO 
development. We're being approached by physicians from all over 
Florida who are proposing new ways of doing business. In 1970 there 
were 1. 2 per 1, 000; in 1982 there were 2. 07 per 1, 000. We see young 
physicians coming into the community very happy to join HMOs and 
PPOs; established physicians are coming to us and saying they w9uld 
like to be involved in these programs. That's important because 
their cooperation is a make or break issue. 
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Here is an initial result of a PPO in Denver; its initial because 
they're very new. In comparison to the NON-PPO 5. 4 vs. 5. 9 days, 
$5 32 cost per day vs $635. Incidently, in South Florida we have 
over 500 physicians who are board certified and board eligible that 
have signed up for a program in which their fee schedule is slightly 
more than 50% of what we consider to be the upper limit -- which a 




1. Be fully aware of your company situation. 
2. Be knowledgeable about the health care 
industry in your area. 
3. Help stimulate development of competitive 
health care markets by: 
o Promoting development of alternative 
delivery systems (HMOs and PPOs). 
o Offering alternative delivery programs to 
your employees. 
o Implementing cost containment measures in 
your benefit design. 
For employers be aware of your company situation, get involved in 
statistical financial analysis. Be knowledgeable about the industry 
in your area. Help stimulate the development of competitive health 
care markets by promoting their development, by offering alternative 
programs to your employees, and by implementing cost containment 
measures in your benefit design (and evaluating them). 
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4. Encourage health lifestyles among your 
employees and sponsor supportive programs. 
5. Participate in and reorient health planning 
and regulation. 
6. Develop coalitions and engage the support of 
other businesses in achieving coaliton 
objectives. 
Encourage healthy lifestyles, participate in and reorient health 
planning and regulation. These things have a life of their own once 
they get started. Develop coalitions and engage in the support of 




Blue cross and Blue Shield recommends a flexible, 
incremental, approach to market reform, emphasizing 
leadership, rather than legislation, including the 
following: 
1. Endorse a market reform strategy. 
2. Challenge the private sector to get involved. 
3. Authorize supportive measures. Get the government 
to authorize supportive measures (taking long 
periods of time for intense scrutiny on contracts 
that are totally experimental because they may 
violate some aspects of the insurance code or some 
other part of the law is counterproductive) .  
4. Selectively deregulate the health care and 
insurance industries. 
5. Review and redefine the role of the Health care 
Cost Containment Board. (The average hospital who 
got other than a cursory review by staff had 
something problematic about their budget. At the 
end of five years of operation, the Board is 
reviewing those hospitals five months after the 
year starts. That is not atypical. We cannot 
always assume that the government operates 
smoothly. ) 
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6. waive mandated benefits for the competitive models. 
7. Improve the Medicaid Program. 
8. Equitably distribute the burden of indigent care 
to allow price competition. 
9. Protect and encourage PPO development (HMO already 
has that via Federal law ) .  
10. Establish a commission to conduct comprehensive 
research. 
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We are one of the largest states in the Union. We really don't have 
a significant graduate program of education and resultant research 
on health care economics and statistics that would give us a work 
product. As a member of the Governor's Task Force, I sat for 
countless months listening to experts from Baltimore, New Yoik City, 
Connecticut come in and tell me what Florida was like on the 
assumption it was like the rest of the world. It was simultaneously 
tragic and hilarious because we have very little factual information 
about health care and health care economics in Florida. Those 
constitute the recommendations that we have. I appreciate your time 
very much and will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 
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